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Abstract 
The paper investigates the stability properties of markets with backward bending supply 
curves. Parameters are chosen so that the two classic models of price dynamics, the 
Walrasian model and the Marshallian model, give opposite predictions. The results are: 
(1) market instability can be observed; (2) in the backward bending case stability is 
captured by the Walrasian model and the Marshallian model of dynamics is rejected. 
Previous experiments have demonstrated that the Marshallian model works in the forward 
falling case. Thus, which theory of dynamics is appropriate for a market depends upon 
the underlying reasons for demand and supply shapes. 
MARKET STABILITY: BACKWARD BENDING SUPPLY IN A 
LABORATORY EXPERIMENTAL MARKET 
Charles R. Plott 
I. Introduction 
Two classical concepts of market stability exist in the literature. One is based on analysis 
introduced by Alfred Marshall, traditionally called Marshallian stability, and the second 
was introduced by Leon Walras, traditionally called Walrasian stability. 1 The Walrasian 
notion seems to have survived in a popular sense and is the one typically found in the 
literature and textbooks.2 However, in spite of a lack of popularity, it is the Marshallian 
concept that has received support in experiments. This study continues an investigation 
6fthe Marshallian and Walrasian concepts by exploring experimental environments in 
which income effects play an important role. Previous experiments, in which the 
Marshallian concept of stability characterized the nature of the market adjustment 
process, were based on the existence of an extemality, much like a "fad" or a "cascade." 
The question posed is whether or not markets can exhibit instability when income effects 
are pronounced and, if so, which concept most accurately represents market behavior in 
such cases. 
Interest in stability concepts sterns from complicated questions about the nature of market 
dynamics, disequilibrium market behavior, and the general process of market 
adjustments. Interest also sterns from a natural academic curiosity about the predictive 
accuracy of classical theoretical ideas. Since the classical models of stability are 
relatively simple and have not been fully tested,3 they are natural models to explore in the 
hope that they will lead to insights about the price discovery process in markets. 
The class of economic environments with downward sloping market supply provides an 
opportunity for an experimental investigation of market stability. That is, when price 
decreases the quantity supplied increases or equivalently, when price increases the 
quantity supplied decreases. Within this class of environments, where both the demand 
curve and the supply curve have negative slope, the Marshallian and Walrasian models 
give substantially different predictions about the conditions under which market 
instability will be observed. Thus, appropriately defined experiments can test the two 
concepts against each other. 
Two different types of downward sloping market supply are consistent with the existence 
of multiple, competitive suppliers. First is the case of the "forward falling" supply which 
is created by the existence of an externality. In the forward falling case the supply curve 
decreases because the costs of suppliers decrease as the market volume, which includes 
the sales of competitors, increase. Marshall called this phenomenon "external 
economies" and referred to industry economies of scale as opposed to economies of scale 
at the firm level. Experiments in the forward falling, "extemality" environment, have 
lead to a clear rejection of the Walrasian model and acceptance of the Marshallian model 
(Plott and George, 1992; Plott and Smith, 1999).4 The second is the case of the 
"backward bending" supply which is created by the existence of negative income effects. 
For example, as income goes up due to wage increases, people might be less inclined to 
work so the supply of labor goes down. The research reported here is focused on this 
income effect or a "backward bending" supply curve. 
II. Two Classical Models of Market Dynamics and Stability 
Both of the classical models assume that all information relevant for market adjustments 
is captured by aggregates of individual behavior represented by market demand and 
market supply. These aggregates are of the form: 
(1) D(Xd , Pd)= 0 
(2) S(X5, Ps) = 0. 
The two equations capture the relationship between a price variable and a market quantity 
variable for each of the demand side of the market and the supply side of the market. The 
variables Pd and P s are respectively the demand price and the supply price and the Xd and 
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demanded, 18 units, so the price falls. Notice that the movement is toward the 
equilibrium point A, so the equilibrium is said to be stable according to the Walrasian 
model. 
Three observations are useful. First, the two models give different conditions under 
which market instability will be c:>bserved. In cases like point A, under condition D1, the 
predictions of the two models are exactly opposite. If supply is negatively sloped and if 
demand cuts supply from below, then the equilibria is Walrasian stable and Marshallian 
unstable. If demand hits supply from above, then the point is Walrasian unstable and 
Marshallian stable. 
Second, the two models give different (essentially opposite) predictions about the 
direction of movements of prices and quantities. These differences provide a partial basis 
for the tests that will be reported here. 
Third, the two models employ different definitions of equilibrium. When the parameters 
are sufficiently smooth, the definitions are equivalent. Ambiguities begin to appear when 
variables can take only discrete values. Since discreteness is a property of almost any 
experiment, conventions must be developed to deal with the problem. This observation 
will be discussed in greater detail later. 
III. The Research Questions 
The logic of the experimental design can be seen in Figure 1 and is closely related to the 
research questions that are posed. The strategy was for the experiments to begin with one 
demand condition and then after equilibrium occurred, if it did occur, the demand would 
be shifted to the other demand condition. If the data had converged to one the 
equilibrium represented by the points A, B, or C in Figure 1, under the first demand 
condition, the presumption would be that the equilibrium was stable. After the change in 
demand the equilibrium the equilibrium would be unstable according to the same theory 
that predicted it to be stable. Regardless of which theory applied, any equilibrium that 
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Xs are the demand and supply quantities. The literature has recognized different theories 
about how the aggregates might be formed from individual decisions, but the analysis 
here will follow general equilibrium models (Arrow and Hahn, 1971). 
Figure 1 contains a graphical representation of the parameters that were implemented in 
the experiments to be discussed later. The market supply curve is downward sloping. 
Exactly how this is achieved will be discussed in Section III. Two different market 
demand situations were studied. These are represented by the curves D1 and D2 • 
The Marshallian model assumes that Xs = Xd = X and that the direction and speed of price 
adjustments are of the form: 
(1) dX/dt = G(Pd (X) - Ps(X)). 
The equation reflects the fact that the Marshallian model represents dynamic market 
behavior as a change in volume that results from a discrepancy between the demand price 
at the existing volume and the supply price at that volume. Specifically, in the left panel 
of Figure 1 ,  at a volume of 22 units and under demand condition D1, the demand price of 
152 is less than the supply price of 165. According to the Marshallian model, volume 
should decrease because the demand price is less than the supply price. Notice that the 
movement is away from the equilibrium at point A, so the equilibrium is unstable 
according to the Marshallian model of market dynamics. 
The W alrasian model assumes that Pd = P s = P and that the direction and speed of price 
adjustments follow a law of the form: 
(2) dP/dt = F ( Xd (P) - XsCP)). 
The implication of the equation is that the Walrasian model represents the dynamics of 
market movements as resulting from a difference in the quantity demanded at a given 
price and the quantity supplied at that price. Suppose the price is 156 and that the 
demand condition is D1• At that price the quantity supplied, 25 units, is above quantity 
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was stable under the first condition would be unstable under the second (with the 
exception of the extreme points which might disappear as equilibria after the shift). 
Three basic research questions are posed. First, does the ordinary demand and supply 
model work in the sense that equilibria of that model predict the ultimate "resting place" 
of the market data? The answer to this first question is not obvious because in the 
backward bending case the theoretical market supply curve is derived from the hypothesis 
that individual agent suppliers solve a constrained maximization problem with a constant 
market price. In the continuous double auction there is no constant market price so the 
hypothesis of constrained maximization on which demand curves are developed can be 
questioned. Furthermore, rules of thumb or heuristics, which behaviorists suggest are 
generally used might lead to decisions in these markets that is much different from the 
competitive model. The answer to the question is further obscured by the presence of 
nonconvexities in the experiment, which will be described in the next section. Thus, 
failure of the equilibria of the demand and supply model to predict the time patterns of 
the actual market behavior would not be a surprising event; certainly the predictive 
accuracy of the model cannot be taken for granted. 
Second, do the classical concepts of stability apply at all? Do markets reflect instabilities 
of any sort? Both classical models are insensitive to major features of the environments 
that might be important from the point of view of models derived from game theory. 
They depend only upon parameters found in the demand and supply representation of the 
economic environment, i.e., the shape and position of the aggregate curves, but are silent 
about variables related to strategic behavior. Consideration of the complexities of human 
expectations and strategic decisions are absent. Thus models derived from principles of 
game theory could lead to completely different predictions. Since the classical concepts 
of demand and supply were not derived from first principles of individual decisions and 
since the arguments in support of the classical notions of stability are typically only 
arguments based on analogy to physics, there are ample reasons to doubt the ability of the 
models to predict what might be observed in markets. 
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Third, if markets exhibit properties of instability, which of the classical models best 
captures what is observed? Previous research on the forward falling case yielded positive 
answers to the first two questions. The answer to the third was that in the forward falling 
demand case the Marshallian concept fits the dynamics of the process and the Walrasian 
concept is rejected. Thus, the issue is whether or not the same results hold in the 
backward bending case. 
IV. Parameters: The Economic Environments 
The economic environment includes the preferences and endowments of agents. In these 
experiments agents can be identified as suppliers and demanders. Since the supply is 
more complicated it will be discussed first. Individual and market demand will be 
discussed second. In some circumstances price ceilings are imposed. The nature and 
reasons for them will be reviewed third. 
A. Supply 
The backward bending supply curve creates a technical problem for experimentation. 
The nature of the supply requires the use of a two-dimensional nonlinear preference map 
with negative income effects. The dollar payoff of subjects depended nonlinearly on two 
variables, francs held at the end of a period, and x units are supplied to the market by the 
individual. In a sense, the x units supplied were like labor, the supply of which gave 
negative utility, and the units of francs held at the end of a period are similar to the 
consumption of "other things." All sales were in terms of francs so the francs held by the 
subject at the end of a period depended upon the number of units sold and the franc 
prices. Suppose, for example, an individual sells x units at a price of P francs per unit. 
Franc income would then be F = Px and the dollar payoff to the subject at the end of the 
period would be U (x,F) where U ( ., . ) is the dollar incentive function. 
Three different types of seller agents existed in the markets. There were two agents of 
each type giving a total of six suppliers. The general functional form5 of an individual 
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seller agent's incentive function, U (x,F), is in US cents and has a functional form as 
follows when 
k = the seller type, 0, 1, 2 and 
F = total francs held at the end of the period by the individual 
x = the number of units supplied by the individual. 
(3) U (x,F) = - 150 if (x,F) = (0,0) 
U ( x , F) = 
400 - [ 19,600 x2 +l 008 k x- 520 ,800 x+ 
13 
' 
13 
+ 168 F + 235 k 2 + 312 ,325 + 6 '59
lkF -
IOO x 
5,239 F + 2,197 F
2 
_ 15 813 k
]112 
2x  400 x2 
' 
if F � _ 33,600 x
2 
+ 3,100 x _ 6 kx  
2,197 13 
400 - 14 . 94 7 x if otherwise 
The indifference curves of the incentive function for an individual of type k = 1 are 
shown in Figure 2. Some of the prominent features are in need of explanation. First, the 
lack of convexity is a significant departure from the assumptions of most models. We 
were unable to find examples of convex preferences that have properties of linear 
backward bending supply over the interesting ranges and which approached zero supply 
at sufficiently high prices. We suspect that nonconvexity is a necessary condition (for the 
differentiable cases) for these properties. A second feature is that the indifference curves 
become vertical with sufficiently large quantities. This is only a convenience. Notice 
that the "otherwise" statement of the utility function is defining vertical indifference 
curves. The inequality condition involving F describes the arch in the (x,F) plane below 
which the utility values given by the formula are real and above which utility values do 
not depend on F, so indifference curves are vertical. 6 The third feature of the function is 
the fact that U(O,O)<O. That is, individuals who do nothing lose money. This feature 
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drives the competitive supply to a positive quantity at a zero price. Individuals would 
prefer to supply a positive amount at P = 0 rather than supply nothing. 
Figure 2 is used to explain the theory/technology using one of the actual dollar payoff 
functions as an example. The level surfaces in the (x,F) space are as shown. The dollar 
figure represents the dollar payoff to the subjects should his/her end of period (franc 
inventory, units supplied) vector be on the indifference curve. Suppose, for example, the 
franc price in the market was a constant 54 francs per unit. The budget constraint 
represented by line B shows franc incomes as a function of x sales. Dollar income is 
maximized at a sale of x = 10 units and franc income 540, which yields a dollar income of 
about $2.40. So, the number of units supplied by this individual at a P of 54 francs is 10. 
According to the theory of competitive supply this procedure of maximizing 
o:tility/dollars at different franc prices can be used to trace out the individual supply 
function giving x supplied by the individual as a function of P. 
The competitive model, when applied to the incentive functions defined above, yields 
linear supply functions that are negatively sloped for each individual. In particular, the 
supply functions of individuals, where P is the market price and k is the individual type, 
are given by 
(4) xk (P) = (3/700)(3100-13P - 78 k) 
When there are two agents of each type and k e 0, 1,2 the market supply, Xs, given by an 
application of the competitive model is 
(5) Xs = L:k=o 2 xk = (9/350)( 3022 - 13 P) = 77.1 - .3343 P. 
However, because only integral amounts can be supplied, the supply function becomes 
vertical at one unit. Beyond a certain level of francs, the individual supplier is indifferent 
about the additional amount of francs that the one unit sells for as was discussed above. 
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B. Demand 
Each market had six demanders, two of each of three different types, { 1,2,3}. Two 
different demand conditions existed across the markets which are indicated as conditions 
DJ and D2. The redemption values are given in Table I. Again, the exception is 
experiment 030589. 
By application of competitive theory to these individual incentive functions, market 
demand curves can be derived. The aggregates of individual demands are shown as D1 
and D2 in the two panels of Figure 1. 
C. Price Ceilings 
A feature of the unstable equilibria of mathematical/theoretical models is that small 
IYerturbations away from an unstable equilibrium will precipitate a series of movements 
away from that equilibrium and toward the nearest stable equilibrium. The natural 
question to pose is whether or not we can observe the market phenomena that are 
captured by this property of the model. 
Price ceilings were used to force economic activity into regions near but not at the 
unstable equilibria of the models. Such ceilings were in the form of a restriction that 
neither bids or asks could be above some fixed, ceiling amount. As will be discussed later 
in this paper, prices in the experimental markets seemed capable of "sticking" at both 
stable and unstable equilibria. When this happened a ceiling was imposed below the 
equilibria to see if the market activity stayed at the ceiling or moved away from the 
ceiling in the direction of the model's nearest stable equilibria. 
The price ceilings were at either 120 or 60 depending upon the demand conditions. As 
will be discussed later, these ceilings were always just below a Walrasian unstable 
(Marshallian stable) equilibrium. 
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D. Information 
All information about costs and redemption values was private. The cost schedules of 
suppliers were constant. However, each period a new indifference map was supplied so 
the supply parameters could have changed for some without other agents knowing that 
something happened. 
Similarly, demanders were given fresh redemption value sheets each period. When 
demand changes occurred each individual demander knew his/her own redemption 
changed so he/she could correctly guess that the market demand had changed. However, 
suppliers had no such clues. If the information controls worked, demand changes 
occurred without suppliers knowing that a change of parameters had occurred. Their only 
source of information would have been the market activity. 
V. Model Structure: Equilibria, Dynamics, and 
Econometric Specification 
Under conditions D1, there are four interesting equilibria, points A,B,C and F. Under 
condition D2 there are four interesting equilibria, A,B,C and E. Some controversy might 
exist about the nature of the boundary equilibria C, H and E, but for completeness these 
will be added to the set of possibilities without such detailed comment.7 Table II is a 
summary of the points that are Walrasian stable (Marshallian stable) under conditions D1• 
When the demand is shifted the Walrasian (Marshallian) stable points under D1 become 
Marshallian (Walrasian) under D2• In some cases the shift in demand causes points to 
disappear as equilibria. 
A comment should be added about the definition of equilibria. The Marshallian 
definition is not the same as the Walrasian. The natural definition under the Walrasian 
structure is a price such that quantity demanded equals quantity supplied. Under 
Marshall it is a quantity at which demand price equals supply price. Take for example a 
quantity of 54 under condition D1• The demand price for the 54th unit is 85 but the 
demand price for the 55th unit is 45. The supply price for the 54th unit is 69 but the 
1 0  
supply price of the 55th unit is 66. Under such conditions, can one say that demand price 
equals supply price at the 541h unit as required by the Marshallian definition of 
equilibrium? The convention adopted in this paper is to define such points as equilibria 
because no gains from trade are possible at the 55111 unit. 
In modem terminology the Walrasian concept is similar to the intersection of demand and 
supply correspondences. The Marshallian concept is similar to a quantity that "supports" 
a competitive price. The concepts of equilibria can also be defined as limits of 
appropriate dynamic processes. 
The existence of discontinuities creates some ambiguities and since discontinuities make 
a natural appearance in any experimental environment, judgments must be made about 
the best way to extend the model. In this paper, the dynamic models will be developed in 
the context of continuous functions. Let the demand equation be and the supply equation 
be piecewise linear and in the linear portions it would be 
(6) Xd-ad-bdPd=O 
and the supply equation be piecewise linear and in the linear portions 
(7) XS -as -bs PS= 0 
where Xd and Xs are the demand and supply quantities and Pd and Ps represent demand 
and supply prices. The Walrasian model of dynamics is 
(8) P=Ps=Pd 
dP/dt = F(Xd -Xs) = F (ad -as+ (bd -bs) P) 
F' (•) > 0. 
That is, if quantity demand at a price is greater than quantity supplied then prices will 
increase. 
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The Marshallian model of dynamics is 
(9) X =Xd =Xs 
dP/dt = G( Pd -Ps) = G (a/bs -a/bd + [1/bd - libs] X) 
G' (.)>O. 
That is, if demand price at a quantity is greater than supply price then quantity increases. 
It is important to notice that ad, as, bd , and bs are all known to the experimenter since 
they are parameters chosen as part of the experimental design. Consequently, Pd, Pd Xd 
and Xs are computable under appropriate assumptions. 
The following assumptions will be the bases for the econometric measurements. 
Assumption 1. The time t refers to an experimental period. 
Assumption 2. Xt = the observed number of transactions in period t. 
Assumption 3. P1, = the observed average price in period t. 
Assumption 4. The speeds of adjustment are linear, i.e., F (Xz -Xs) =P M(Pd -Ps) 
Under assumptions 1 through 4 the following models can be estimated. For the 
Walrasian dynamics the model is 
(10) Pt+! - pt= aw+ Pw(Xd -XS) +Ew 
= aw+ Pw[ dd - as + (bd -bs)Pt]+ Ew 
For the Marshallian dynamics the econometric model is 
(11) xt + I - xt = aM + PM(P d - p s) + Em 
under both views of dynamics the estimated parameters should be aM = aw = 0, PM , Pw > 
0. This follows from the assumption that F'(•) > 0 and G'(•) > 0 and that the demand and 
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supply equilibria be the limit of the dynamic process. Of course, given the parameters of 
these environments, the downward sloping supply, one would expect Pw PM< 0. That is, 
if the dynamics are accurately predicted by one of the models (i.e., P > 0) it is natural to 
anticipate the dynamics predicted by the other model to be exactly wrong. 
In the analysis below the two models (10) and (11) will be estimated separately. 
VI. Research Strategy and Experimental Designs 
A total of six experimental markets were conducted. All subjects were students at the 
California Institute of Technology. All markets operated within the framework of an 
electronic Multiple Unit Double Auction (Plott and Gray, 1990). A control pilot 
experiment was conducted utilizing the multiple oral double auction. The data are not 
� 
reported here. 8 
The relationships among experiments, periods, and environments are in Table III. The 
research design reflects the fact that subject time and research funding are scarce 
resources. Thus, in some cases parameters were changed before full equilibration was 
established in any statistical sense, such as low price variance. Instead, sequences of 
treatments were employed, which produced data on the dynamics and movement of the 
system in response to the underlying circumstances. Thus the experimental design 
reflected a process of sequential decisions in which the choice of treatment variables in 
any one experiment reflected the accumulation of evidence from the experiments 
conducted previously and judgements about when "sufficient" data had been collected. 
The first two experiments began with the D 2 parameters. This reflected an expectation 
based on Plott and George (1992) that the system would be near the Marshallian stable 
equilibrium in the middle of the parameter space. The first two experiments destroyed 
this presumption and also created three additional presumptions, which influenced the 
overall research design. First, the markets will equilibrate. If the markets are maintained 
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under stationary conditions, the data will "tighten" around the equilibrium once they are 
"near." Secondly, the data can "sit" near prices that are unstable according to the 
Walrasian model. 
The fact that markets might be able to "sit" at an unstable equilibrium motivated the 
invention of some sort of vehicle that would "perturb" the market away from the 
equilibrium. The tool employed for this purpose was price ceilings. The dynamic 
models suggest that such perturbations will cause market movement to the nearest stable 
equilibria. 
Price ceilings were used to explore two special phenomena. The first was convergence to 
�_price of zero. Such a phenomenon would seem to be unusual and unexpected by the 
scientific community. To the extent that differential weight is placed on a model's ability 
to predict the existence of phenomena outside the ordinary realm of experiences, such 
treatments are important. The second phenomenon is the response of markets to the 
removal of nonbinding price ceilings. Theory suggests that removing nonbinding 
ceilings should have no effect but experiments have demonstrated that they do. Isaac and 
Plott ( 1981) discovered the existence of such efforts. The possible influences of 
nonbinding price controls are explored more here. 
The sequential decision nature of the design resulted in the following rules governing 
experiments later in the series. Begin the parameters with a stable Walrasian equilibrium 
near the center of the parameter space and let it remain unchanged until price variance 
was "small." Change the parameters to switch the stability properties of the equilibria. If 
the prices move up let them continue until the upward movement is well established and 
then impose a price ceiling below the (now) unstable Walrasian equilibrium from which 
the prices moved. If the prices remain the same do nothing for several periods to 
determine if they will move themselves. If no movement occurs impose the price ceiling 
below the unstable Walrasian equilibrium (to see if prices move further down to the 
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stable equilibrium below). Remove the ceiling. After a few periods to determine the 
direction of price movements and observe if a new equilibrium emerged, change demand 
parameters to the original set to switch stability conditions. If the removal of the ceiling 
caused prices to jump to the highest equilibrium, impose a price ceiling below the lowest 
unstable Walrasian equilibrium to see if the prices would converge to zero. If time 
allowed remove the nonbinding ceiling. 
VII. Results 
The results all suggest one overriding conclusion. The Walrasian model works. Even 
unexpected phenomena closely correspond to reasonable interpretations of the Walrasian 
model. The results are listed below in a way that makes that correspondence clear. In 
addition, the results record the existence of phenomena that the model does not address 
but are nevertheless of interest for an understanding of the market price discovery 
process. 
Figures 3 through 7 contain the time series of prices. Each figure contains the stable 
Walrasian equilibria represented by solid lines and the stable Marshallian equilibria 
represented by dotted lines. Of course, each of the equilibria has the property that when it 
is stable according to one model, it is unstable by the other (if it exists as an equilibrium 
in the other). Vertical lines represent periods and the double vertical lines represent 
periods in which some parameter change was implemented in the experiment. Price 
ceilings were imposed in some periods and these are represented by the heavy dashed 
lines. 
The time series of volumes are in Table IV. The volumes are shown for each period of 
each experiment. In addition, the table contains the distances from stable Walrasian and 
stable Marshallian equilibria, which are closest to the final values of the period before a 
condition change. The first three results address the central questions posed by the 
research. The competitive model captures the equilibration properties of the backward 
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bending supply case and it is the Walrasian model that does the job. The Marshallian 
model is rejected in favor of the Walrasian model. 
The first parts of experiments 030589, 030889 and 040989 in Figures 3, 4 and 5 provide 
good illustrations. In Figure 3 prices in the first two periods were near the unstable 
Walrasian (stable Marshallian) equilibrium point "A" from Figure 1. However over the 
eleven periods of stationary conditions prices can be seen moving away from point "A" to 
point "B", which is stable Walrasian (unstable Marshallian). In Figure 4 prices again 
begin near point "A" but this time converge upward toward point "D", which is a stable 
Walrasian equilibrium, and then the parameters are changed in the 7th period so point "A" 
is Walrasian stable and the market quickly converges toward it. In Figure 5 the 
experiments begin with point "A" implemented as a stable Walrasian equilibrium 
(unstable Marshallian) and the market converges to it during the five periods of stable 
parameters. In this experiment point "A" becomes unstable Walrasian after a parameter 
change beginning with the sixth period and as can be seen that during periods six through 
nine there is no movement away from the point even though it is now Walrasian unstable. 
At the beginning of the tenth period a price ceiling was placed on the market just below 
the equilibrium price "A" and as can be seen the prices immediately began to move below 
the ceiling falling away to the nearest stable Walrasian equilibrium point "B". 
The first result addresses the first question that was posed about the applicability of the 
competitive model in such a complex experimental environment. Recall that for several 
reasons discussed in Section II one might doubt the ability of any form of competitive 
equilibria model to capture behavior in the backward bending case. The result states that 
the equilibrium notions of the competitive model survive to the experimental test. 
Result 1 
In all cases the data move to prices near the equilibria of the model. 
Support. The statement does not distinguish between stable and unstable equilibria. For 
purposes of analysis the data are taken to be the last period of a treatment. The difference 
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between the average price (total volume) in the period and the nearest equilibrium of the 
model (stable or unstable) is computed. If the high price periods are omitted, because the 
approach is always from below and the number of periods is always small, the average 
deviation from the model is less than two francs for the price and less than one and one 
unit on the quantity. The largest error is 17 francs (with a volume error of 6) and fifteen 
units on the volume (with a price error of 11 francs) The hypothesis that the data are near 
a competitive equilibrium cannot be rejected. D 
The next two results are statements that say the Walrasian model and not the Marshallian 
model captures the nature of the equilibration process. It is important to note that these 
result address market movement and not market "resting" since, as was illustrated in 
Figure 5 and discussed above, the markets can remain at an unstable equilibrium. That is 
the essence of Result 2. 
Result 2 
Environmental perturbations that cause movement in market prices result in price patterns 
near a stable Walrasian equilibrium. 
Support. A total of twenty treatments were implemented during the five experimental 
sessions. Each of these conditions existed one or more periods. Examining only the final 
periods under a treatment condition, the data were closer to a stable Walrasian 
equilibrium than to a stable :f\4arshallian equilibrium in seventeen of the twenty periods. 
Each of the three cases in which the final period prices were closer to the stable 
Marshallian equilibrium than the stable Walrasian equilibrium, were special in the sense 
that prices started at the stable Marshallian equilibrium and moved very little during the 
periods. D 
The next result is based on the econometric estimates of equations (10) and (11 ). These 
are reported in Table V and are summarized by Result 4. The result simply says that 
through the eyes of those models the movements are in the direction predicted by 
Walrasian dynamics. 
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Result 3 
Estimates of the dynamic models can only be interpreted as resulting from Walrasian (as 
opposed to Marshallian) dynamics. 
Support. Both models as represented in equations (10) and (11) were estimated. The 
estimates are reported in Table V. Recall that the slope coefficient should be positive and 
the intercept term should be zero. For the Walrasian model the estimated slope 
coefficients in every experiment are positive and significant. The intercept terms in the 
estimates for the Walrasian model are not significantly different from zero in two cases 
and in the three other cases the intercept term is significantly negative. By contrast, the 
slope coefficient for the Marshallian model is negative in all cases and it is significantly 
negative in four of the five experiments. The intercept term of the Marshallian model is 
significantly different from zero in four of the five experiments. Thus, the data move in 
the direction predicted by the Walrasian model and move in a direction opposite of that 
predicted by the Marshallian model. Because the models give opposite predictions one 
can interpret both sets of estimates as supporting the presumption that the Walrasian 
model and not the Marshallian model describes market movement. D 
The next result can be interpreted as an extreme test for the W alrasian dynamics model. 
As was discussed above, under conditions D1 a stable Walrasian equilibrium exists at a 
price of 0. Since one does not ordinarily see positive supplies at zero prices, the model 
predicts the existence of unusual phenomena that is worthy of exploration. The result is 
captured most dramatically in Figures 6 and 7. In Figure 6 in period 18 a price ceiling 
was imposed just below point "B" which is an unstable Walrasian equilibrium. Notice 
that all previous prices had been at the highest stable Walrasian equilibrium and in period 
18 both a parameter change and a price ceiling were implemented. Prices begin near the 
ceiling and the slowly decay to near zero where the nearest stable Walrasian equilibrium 
exists. The sequence of conditions is replicated in Figure 7, period 18 and the prices 
decay over the four periods to the stable Walrasian equilibrium at a price of zero until the 
ceiling is removed in the final period. 
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The next result simply records the fact that the phenomenon of convergence to a zero 
price was observed even though other equilibria exist. For example, according to the 
Marshallian model prices at the ceiling constitute an equilibrium. 
Result 4 
A price of zero and positive volume, when it exists as a stable Walrasian equilibrium, can 
be observed occurring in a market even though three nonzero-price equilibria exist. 
Support. The appropriate data are from experiment 041089, period, 22 in which the price 
is 5 and volume is 73. This compares favorably to the nearest stable Walrasian equilibria 
which has a price of zero and quantity of 78. Another example is experiment 041389, 
period 21, in which the price is zero and the quantity is 76. Again, this compares 
favorably to (0, 78). In both cases a convergence toward the equilibria is evident. 0 
The final two results record the existence of phenomena that were unanticipated. 
The Result 5 demonstrates that the natural price variability around an unstable 
equilibrium may be insufficient to cause dynamic movement away from that equilibrium. 
A reasonable conjecture is that there exists natural neighborhoods of stability around an 
otherwise unstable equilibrium. This phenomena can be seen in Figure 3 (periods 12 and 
13), Figure 5 (Periods 6 -9, and Periods 17-21). Result 6 demonstrates that beliefs and 
expectations can override all of the "local" dynamics of the model and push prices exactly 
opposite to the direction anticipated by the model. It is interesting precisely because it 
demonstrates the overriding power of expectations and beliefs. 
Result 5 
Market activity can be maintained at an unstable equilibrium. 
Support. The previous results establish the proposition that market activity when 
perturbed by price controls or by parameter changes will converge to the nearest stable 
Walrasian equilibria. That is, Walrasian stability in a model predicts the dynamics of 
price movement. Three parameter changes (experiment 030589, period 12; experiment 
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040989, periods 6 and 17) caused very little movement in market activity. The periods · 
following those perturbations remained at the unstable Walrasian equilibria for several 
periods until a new set of parameters caused movements. 0 
Result 6 
Removal of nonbinding controls can cause market activity to jump from one stable 
equilibrium to another one (the jump was over an unstable equilibrium). 
Support. The relevant periods are experiment 041089 (Figure 6, period 15), and 
experiment 041389, (Figure 7, periods 16 and 22). In all three cases removing a 
nonbinding ceiling caused the market to jump away from the stable equilibrium to which 
it had converged to near a previously experienced, more efficient, stable equilibrium. 
The previously experienced nature of the equilibria is probably important since the 
removed ceiling in an experiment in which the system had not previously attained the 
more efficient stable equilibrium, experiment 040989, period 15, caused no such large 
jump. 0 
VIII. Summary of Conclusions 
One result of this study (Result 1) is to buttress the results of previous experiments that 
demonstrate that markets have dynamic properties that can produce both stable and 
unstable equilibria. Such results demonstrate that markets in disequilibrium are governed 
by a set of laws and these laws are captured, in part, by classical notions. The results also 
underscore the need for a more intense research focus on concepts of disequilibrium. 
However, the central results of the study reflect a discovery about the nature of stability 
and the equilibration process in relation to classical models. The nature of market 
stability is not captured by market level aggregates such as market demand and market 
supply. The results reported here, when joined with the results of other experiments 
[Plott and George; Plott and Smith] demonstrate that in order to detect whether or not a 
market is stable, it is necessary to inquire about the reasons why the aggregates have 
particular shapes. Simply measuring the slopes of aggregate demands and supplies is not 
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sufficient. It is necessary to know why they are sloped the way they are. If the perverse 
slopes are due to an externality then one set of conditions (Marshallian) applies and if the 
perverse slopes are due to income effects the opposite (Walrasian) analysis is needed 
(Results 2, 3 and 4). 
The study also reports discoveries that suggest that a successful theory cannot be based 
on the local properties of the aggregates alone. Expectations play role in stability and 
expectations may have global properties as opposed to local properties. This 
phenomenon was dramatically demonstrated when the removal of a nonbinding price 
ceiling caused the markets to "jump over" an unstable equilibrium (Result 5). That is, 
markets that are equilibrated at a stable equilibrium have the capacity to leave a stable 
equilibrium, jumping over an unstable equilibrium and then equilibrate at a different 
stable equilibrium. This phenomenon was observed on three occasions with the removal 
of price controls, which had been used to force the system away from a more efficient 
stable equilibrium. On the one occasion in which a nonbinding price ceiling was 
removed from a market that had not experienced the more efficient, stable equilibrium, 
the system responded slightly to the removal of the control but then remained at the stable 
equilibrium. 
The study provided an opportunity to observe a market resting at an unstable equilibrium. 
Superficially, the patterns of activity do not seem to be different from systems that are 
resting at a stable equilibrium. Thus, no obvious signal existed to hint that the market 
could suddenly move for no obvious reason. Perhaps further research will produce such 
indicators. 
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'A third of stability, related to the concept of "cobweb" cycles was introduced in the more modem 
literature. The robustness of the cobweb model to different patterns of individual behavior can be 
questioned on the basis of theory (Carlson, 1 968; Auster, 1970) and in experimental tests of the model it 
has been rejected (Carlson, 1 967; Johnson and Plott, 1 989). 
2Henderson and Quandt ( 1980), contains a discussion of the two concepts. The currently standard 
development follows the theory as found in Arrow and Hahn ( 1 97 1 )  or Frank Hahn ( 1 987). 
3The first attempt to test classical adjustment models can be found in Smith ( 1 965). His data analysis lead 
to a rejection of the Walrasian adjustment processes, which in his setting was functionally equivalent to the 
Marshallian concept. Both predict a constant rate of change to the unique competitive equilibrium that 
exists in Smith's parameters. However, subsequent examinations of Smith's data using better econometric 
techniques, reversed Smith's conclusions and found support for the Walrasian model of adjustment in 
�-
Smith's data (Nelson, 1 980). 
4While the Marshallian model of externalities can apply to fads, different models have also been developed 
in the literature (Kami and Levin, 1994). 
5 An exception is experiment 030589 in which the parameters were different from all others. In this 
experiment the demand and supply were tangent at point A so the equilibrium was Walrasian stable at 
prices above A and Walrasian unstable at prices below A. 
6A slight discontinuity of the function occurs here but it causes no problems in the analysis that follows. 
7Typically these are justified as equilibria by appeal to the related theory of dynamics. Take point H for 
example. It is not an equilibrium in the sense that demand price equals supply price. Yet, since supply 
prices is greater that demand price at a quantity of zero the market pressures, according to the Marshallian 
model, is for quantity to fall. Since it is on the boundary it can move no further and by convention is an 
equilibrium. 
8Nothing was observed that motivated a more substantial exploration of the oral procedures. 
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Table I 
Redemption Values for Demanders 
Condition D1 Condition D2 
Units Type a (2) b (2) c (2) a (2) b (2) c (2) 
(number) 
1 164 164 160 410 430 390 
2 160 164 156 350 330 370 
3 152 160 156 270 290 310 
4 152 156 152 230 210 250 
5 149 149 149 170 190 130 
6 149 145 141 110 76 90 
7 145 145 141 76 76 72 
8 136 141 136 72 68 72 
9 125 105 136 68 64 68 
10 25 45 85 64 64 64 
11 0 0 5 60 56 60 
12 60 56 52 
13 56 52 52 
14 44 48 48 
15 44 44 48 
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Table II 
Equilibria Locations and Stability Properties 
(Prices are in francs) 
D1D1D1 D2D2D2 
Point Coordinates Stability Coordinates Stability 
Properties Properties 
(P, Q) (P, Q) 
A (149,28) Walrasian (145-151,28) Walrasian 
Stable Unstable 
Marshallian Marshallian 
Unstable Stable 
B (61-67, 56) Walrasian (64,56) Walrasian 
Unstable Stable 
Marshallian Marshallian 
Stable Unstable 
c (0, 61) Walrasian (0,61) No Walrasian 
Stable Equilibrium 
Marshallian No Marshallian 
Unstable Equilibrium 
D (370-390, 6) No Walrasian (370-390,6) Walrasian 
Equilibrium Stable 
No Marshallian Marshallian 
Equilibrium Unstable 
E* (0, 90) No Walrasian (0,90) Walrasian 
Equilibrium Unstable 
No Marshallian Marshallian 
Equilibrium Stable 
H* (164,0) No Walrasian (164,0) No Walrasian 
Equilibrium Equilibrium 
Marshallian No Marshallian 
Stable Equilibrium 
*Other interpretations exist for these boundary cases. 
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Table III 
Parameters by Experiment by Period 
Experiment D1D1D1 D2D2D2 
Periods Ceiling Periods Ceiling 
030589 1-11 no 
12-15 no 
040889 1-6 no 
7-12 no 
13-21 different no 
demand parameters 
040989 1-5 no 
6-9 no 
10-14 yes 
15-16 no 
17-21 no 
041089 1-4 no 
5-9 no 
10-14 yes 
15-16 no 
17-22 yes 
041389 1-8 no 
9-12 no 
13-15 yes 
16-17 no 
18-21 yes 
22 no 
27 
Table IV 
Volume in All Period of All Experiments and Distance from Equilibria 
Experiment 030589 040889 040989 041089 041389 
Period Volume WE ME Volume WE ME Volume WE ME Volume WE ME Volume WE ME 
I 26 56 28 21 6 28 40 28 56 29 28 56 53 28 56 
2 30 56 28 8 6 28 32 28 56 32 28 56 45 28 56 
3 29 56 28 7 6 28 33 28 56 29 28 56 48 28 56 
4 30 56 28 6 6 28 29 28 56 31 28 56 45 28 56 
5 31 56 28 7 6 28 27 28 56 16 6 28 44 28 56 
6 35 56 28 7 6 28 29 56 28 8 6 28 40 28 56 
7 38 56 28 16 28 56 28 56 28 7 6 28 37 28 56 
8 47 56 28 20 28 56 28 56 28 8 6 28 33 28 56 
9 57 56 78 24 28 56 28 56 28 9 6 28 17 6 28 
10 61 56 78 27 28 56 38 56 28* 37 56 28* 8 6 28 
11 62 56 78 31 28 56 38 56 28* 41 56 28* 6 6 28 
N 12 60 62 56 29 28 56 49 56 28* 43 56 28* 6 6 28 
00 13 58 62 56 20 53 56 28* 46 56 28* 35 56 28* 
14 57 62 56 21 56 56 28* 51 56 28* 50 56 28* 
15 62 62 56 23 51 56 28 10 6 28 55 56 28* 
16 24 53 56 28 6 6 28 14 6 28 
17 25 50 28 56 6 6 28 6 6 28 
18 25 53 28 56 60 62 56* 64 62 56* 
19 27 53 28 56 62 62 56* 76 62 56* 
20 29 55 28 56 63 62 56* 78 62 56* 
21 31 55 28 56 70 62 56* 76 62 56* 
22 73 62 56* 28 56 
*The price associated with this volume is above the price ceiling. 
Table V 
Coefficient Estimates (t- statistics) 
Walrasian: P1+1 - Pt= aw+ Pw [D(Pt) - S(Pt)] +Et 
Marshallian: X1+1 - Xt = aM +PM [ Pn(Xt) - Ps (Xt)] +Et 
Experiments 
030589 040889 040989 041089 041389 
N 13 10 18 17 18 
Walrasian: 
" -6.392 10.975 -3.807 2.991 -32.555 aw (-2.94) (1.08) (-1.73) (0.86) (-1.49) 
" 0.352 2.587 1.043 0.925 4.068 f3w (1.45) (2.43) (3.16) (3.34) (2.50) 
R2 0.161 0.424 0.416 0.427 0.325 
DW 0.560 1.870 1.569 2.322 2.598 
Marshallian: 
" 2.889 2.592 1.439 2.335 10.893 aM (1.95) (1.39) (1.45) (3.05) (2.22) 
" -0.002 -0.034 -0.128 -0.027 -0.217 ,-- /3M (-0.03) (-2.12) (-2.47) (-3.47) (-3.26) 
R2 .00001 0.360 0.303 0.446 0.450 
DW 1.037 1.158 1.369 2.275 2.207 
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Time Series of Trades and Competitive Equilibrium Prices: Experiment 030589 
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Time Series of Trades and Competitive Equilibrium Prices: Experiment 040889 
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Figure 5 
Time Series of Trades and Competitive Equilibrium Prices: Experiment 040989 
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Figure 6 
Time Series of Trades and Competitive Equilibrium Prices: Experiment 041089 
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Time Series of Trades and Competitive Equilibrium Prices: Experiment 041389 
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